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Who Creates Political Business Cycles?
(Should Central Banks Be Blamed?)
Erik Leertouwer and Philipp Maier
1st December 1999
Abstract
Little attention has been paid in most economic studies on political business
cycles to separate the effects of scal and monetary policy. We attempt to as-
sess the effect of monetary policy in a panel model for 16 OECD countries.
To answer the question whether central banks actively create political busi-
ness cycles we focus on the short-term interest rate as a proxy for the use of
monetary instruments. Our results indicate that central banks should not be
blamed for creating political business cycles as we do not nd any evidence
for cyclical behavior in the short-term interest rate. This conclusion holds no
matter whether central banks are independent or not or are constrained by
the exchange rate system in force.
 University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics, P.O. Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Nether-
lands. We would like to thank Jakob de Haan and Tom Wansbeek for useful comments.
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1. Introduction
There are mainly two reasons why central banks are made independent. First, it re-
duces the inationary bias. Many empirical studies provide evidence for that.1 Sec-
ond, the most obvious advantage a fully independent central bank has is that of
not being inuenced by electoral deadlines (Muscatelli, 1998). That the incumbent
government may be inclined to stimulate the economy before elections to enhance re-
election probabilities is well-known.2 Are central banks also inuenced by electoral
deadlines? Put differently, if we observe political business cycles (PBCs) in macroe-
conomic variables such as unemployment and the growth rate, who is responsible for
creating them  and who should not be blamed?
Surprisingly, the empirical literature has little to say about the exact role of govern-
ments and central banks when it comes to PBCs. Worse, in most previous studies
different institutional features have largely been neglected. In many economies the
scope for electorally-motivated monetary policies is reduced, since national or inter-
national restrictions bind central bankers. In a regime of xed exchange rates, for
example, opportunistic policies are less likely to occur than in a exible exchange
rate system. Similarly, independent central banks are less likely to be involved in
electorally motivated policies than central banks that are under the spell of the gov-
ernment. The restricting effects of these institutional features are recognized in eco-
nomic theory, yet many empirical papers on political business cycles do not explicitly
control for them.
Indeed, Clark et al. (1998) argue that common cross-country studies of PBC models
may be seriously awed since they do not account for institutional differences that
constrain national policymakers.3 However, these authors only examine economic
outcomes (output growth and unemployment). Although these variables are likely to
be inuenced by monetary policy, there are a number of other inuences that may
offset or reinforce the impact of monetary policy. Furthermore, the rational political
business cycle predicts that policymakers manipulate instruments while the effects
on outcomes are less certain. This paper tends to ll this gap by focusing on policy
outcomes for which the central bank can be held responsible, namely the short-term
interest rate. Thereby we also wish to answer the question of whether the central bank
can be blamed for active opportunistic behavior. Our sample runs from the 1960s until
1 See Eijfnger and de Haan (1996) for an overview. Posen (1998), however, challenges this view
by providing evidence that a higher degree of central bank independence does not reduce disination
costs.
2 See Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) for an overview.
3 Clark and Hallerberg (1998) formulate this idea in terms of a theoretical model.
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1997 and consists of monthly data for 16 OECD countries. The results are simple and
strikingly robust. With the possible exception of Austria, the short-term interest rate
does not show any sign of a political business cycle. Thus we reject the hypothesis
that central banks actively engage in opportunistic behavior.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we explain the political
business models in more detail and show why internal or external constraints can
prevent politicians from using monetary policy for short-sighted purposes. Our esti-
mation results will be presented in section 3, in section 4 we summarize our ndings.
2. When Do Political Business Cycles Occur?
2.1 Electoral Pressure On The Economy
A test for the existence of political business cycles requires the following. First, we
need a theoretical basis to explain why such short-sighted behavior could be pursued
by the government or the central bank. Second, one has to account for restricting
institutional features that limit the possibility to implement such a policy. And nally,
we need an appropriate measure for the central bank's policy stance.
2.1.1 The Theoretical Framework
The rst model on political business cycles was developed by Nordhaus (1975). It is
based on the assumptions that politicians care only about their re-election and voters
judge the incumbent's performance by the state of the economy. The economy is
characterized by an exploitable Phillips-curve and the incumbent can directly control
the rate of ination. Nordhaus assumed that the government was responsible for both
monetary and scal policy.
Under the assumption of adaptive or non-rational expectations, the incumbent gov-
ernment has an incentive to pursue expansive economic policies before elections to
enhance its probability of re-election by lowering the unemployment rate. After elec-
tions, the government has to ght ination with contractionary monetary policies,
thereby raising the unemployment rate, before switching to expansionary policies
again as the next election approaches. Due to the poor memory of the voters, this
cycle might be repeated endlessly.
Such behavior is called `opportunistic'. The testable prediction of the model is that
before elections the unemployment rate drops due to expansive policies, while after
elections ination is high and contractionary measures are taken. Similar patterns
apply to economic instruments.
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A common criticism concerned the assumption of adaptive expectations. This has
led to a reformulation of the model by Rogoff and Sibert (1987) who expanded the
framework to a `rational political business cycle model' (RPBC). They assume that
voters lack information about the competence of the politicians and in order to appear
`competent', policymakers manipulate policy instruments. The RPBC model predicts
visible cycles in economic instruments, and short, possibly irregular cycles (`blips')
in economic outcomes such as the ination rate or the unemployment rate.
2.1.2 Restricting Institutional Features
The models described make the simplifying assumptions that (a) the central bank
and the government pursue the similar policies, and (b) policymakers have sufcient
national autonomy to implement their policies. Both assumptions need not hold in
reality, as the following two types of constraints may prevent governments from im-
plementing an opportunistic policy:
National Constraint If we assume that the central bank enjoys a low degree of statu-
tory independence, then it is likely that pressure is applied such that mone-
tary policy follows the opportunistic pattern set by scal policy. In this case,
electoral cycles may be observed in monetary instruments. However, central
banks are increasingly made independent. If we abstract from the idea that
central banks have their own interests, due to which they prefer one govern-
ment over another, then one should not expect them to engage in opportunistic
behavior.4 After all, one of the main arguments for making them independent
is that this enables their optimization to be based on a longer time-horizon,
which rules out short-sighted behavior. Still, even for central banks with a
high degree of statutory independence it might be rational to comply to the
government's wishes, as its independence might be threatened by a change in
the central bank law. If this is realized by the central bank, then independent
as well as dependent central banks have an incentive to engage in PBC be-
havior.5
International Constraint From economic theory we know that under a regime of
xed exchange rates and high capital mobility, the scope for autonomous eco-
nomic policies is reduced. Since the worldwide increase in capital mobility in
the 70s we can thus assume that the possibility to implement a national mon-
4 In Vaubel (1993) it is assumed that the central bank follows its own interests.
5 This argument has been put forward by Frey and Schneider (1981) and Berger and Schneider
(1999).
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etary policy has declined for those countries who have either been member of
a xed exchange rate regime (such as the Bretton Woods system or the Euro-
pean Monetary system EMS), or who have pegged their currency unilaterally.
Participation in a xed exchange rate regime, however, restricts national eco-
nomic policies and lowers the possibility of PBCs.
2.1.3 Measuring Monetary Policy
Still unsolved is the question how monetary policy should be measured. Clearly evi-
dence in unemployment or growth rates cannot be solely attributed to the government
or the central bank.6 Previous studies on political business cycles in monetary pol-
icy have in most cases focused on monetary aggregates. Examples of this approach
are Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997), Allen and McCrickard (1991), or Vaubel
(1993), who all use M1.7 A survey of evidence for the US can be found in de Haan
and Gormley (1997). Still, a PBC in, say, M1, does not necessarily imply active cen-
tral bank behavior: If, for instance, the incumbent government uses expansive scal
policy before elections, and the central bank tolerates this behavior, then obviously
a monetary aggregate must reect pre-electoral manipulation.8 However, it would be
unfair to fully blame the central bank, as the PBC was created by the government.
To answer the question of whether central banks regularly misuse monetary policy,
evidence should be found in monetary instruments.9
There is, however, one problem. It is nearly impossible to determine a `key variable'
which fully characterizes the current monetary policy stance. For most countries, fo-
cusing on one single instrument is not possible, as the example of Germany shows.
Different instruments were used over time, and the relative weight of these instru-
ments changed considerably. Open market operations, for example, which were the
most powerful monetary tool in the late 80s and 90s, were fully developed only in
1985. For most countries the monetary instrument does not exist.
6 Examples of this approach include Alesina and Roubini (1992), Soh (1986) and the original paper
from Nordhaus (1975).
7 M1 is commonly used due to data availability.
8 Berger and Woitek (1997a, 1997b) have looked at the German case. They nd cycles in M1 which
could indicate an opportunistic behavior of the Deutsche Bundesbank. However, their ndings indicate
that the Bundesbank did not target a monetary aggregate, but rather economic variables such as ination
or output. Therefore Berger and Woitek conclude that the cycle in M1 was demand-driven rather than
supply-driven.
9 This has the additional advantage that the distinction between PBC and RPBC no longer matters:
Both models predict cycles in policy instruments. Only under the assumption of non-rational expecta-
tions, however, these cycles translate into policy outcomes.
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Still, there is a possibility to circumvent these problems. The direction of monetary
policy is reected in the behavior of interest rates, as monetary instruments either
directly or indirectly inuence interest rates. Therefore they could be viewed as cap-
turing the `net effect' or the `sum' of all monetary instruments.10
There is a second argument why the choice of an interest rate might be appropriate.
If politicians try to inuence a central bank before elections, the demand will in most
cases not be formulated in terms of a monetary aggregate (`Increase the growth rate
of M1'), but in term of interest rates (`Lower the interest rate!').11
Goodhart (1994) provides additional support why researchers should focus on interest
rates - and claims that interest rates are manipulated by politicians:
... those in charge of CBs generally regard monetary base control as
a non-starter. The instrument which they can, and do, control is the
short-term money market rate.
Politicians ... suggest that an electorally inconvenient interest rate in-
crease should be deferred, or a cut 'safely' accelerated. This political
manipulation of interest rates .. leads to a loss of credibility...12
Yet, so far only few researchers have actually tested whether this claimed inuence on
interest rates does indeed exist. In our paper we use short-term interest rates which are
tightly controlled by the central banks and reect their intentions.13 Should political
business cycles exist and should they be actively created by central banks, they should
be visible in the short-term interest rates.
2.2 Institutional Constraints
2.2.1 National Constraints
To account for internal constraints, we rst need to classify the degree of statutory
central bank independence in the various countries. Usually this is done by setting
up criteria to measure the degree of independence and assigning scores to the various
countries. Both require subjective judgement and it comes as no surprise that different
10 A similar view has been taken in Maier (1999).
11 This point has rst been made by Johnson and Siklos (1994)., who used a short-term interest rate
to estimate a VAR model.
12 Goodhart (1994), pp. 1426-27.
13 The German Bundesbank considers the day-to-day rate as `key indicator' (Deutsche Bundesbank,
1995).
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Australia Austria Belgium Canada
+ + - +
Denmark Finland France Germany
+ - - +
Italy Japan New Zealand Norway
- - - -
Spain Sweden United Kingdom United States
- - - +
Table 2.1: Presence National Constraints
authors have come up with different rankings.14
Here, we will primarily use the index developed by Cukierman et al. (CWN, 1992).15
We divide the countries into two groups, those having scores above the median which
we consider as 'independent central banks' and those with scores below the median
('dependent central banks'). This classication is reported in Table 2.1. Countries
ranked above the median value are marked with `+' (i.e., internal constraints are
present) and countries ranked below the median value with `-' (i.e. absence of internal
constraints). We expect this classication to give a reliable overall ranking of the
degree of statutory independence. In the `+' countries PBCs are not likely to occur in
monetary policy, as these countries have an independent central bank. Countries with
a `-' have a central bank with a low degree of statutory independence and if PBCs are
to be found, we expect them there.
2.2.2 International constraints
From an economist's view, the 1970s marked a turning point in at least two respects:
Since the 1970s international capital mobility increased sharply, and the Bretton
Woods system of xed exchange rates collapsed in 1973.16
To classify for each country in our sample those periods where it could determine
its monetary policy in an entirely autonomous way we check its participation in a
14 See Eijfnger and de Haan (1996) for an overview. Forder (1999) argues that ...`the difculties in
measuring independence have not been sufciently overcome to allow persuasive or meaningful tests...'.
See Forder (1999), p. 25
15 Note that the choice of the CBI measure is not crucial for our results. Indeed, we also ran estimates
with other measures of statutory CBI, but as the CBI variable is never signicant in our regressions this
did not qualitatively change our implications.
16 See Clark et al. (1998), pp. 95-99.
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xed exchange rate regime. Our ndings are summarized in Table 2.217. The rst
column shows the participation in the Snake (the predecessor of the European Mon-
etary System EMS), the second column shows the participation in the EMS and the
third column gives the times during which a country pegged its currency.
The last column summarizes those periods where the countries could fully determine
their monetary policy independently, i.e. monetary policy autonomy (MPA) has been
present.18
Country Snake EMS Pegged MPA Present
Australia - - - Entire period
Austria - 1995-98 1973-95 Before 1973
Belgium 1973-78 1979-98 - Before 1973
Canada - - - Entire period
Denmark 1973-78 1979-98 - Before 1973
Finland - 1996-98 1977-96 Before 1977
France Intermittent 1979-98 - Before 1979
Germany 1973-78 1979-98 - Before 1973, after 1979
Italy - Intermittent - Before 1979
Japan - - - Entire period
N. Zealand - - 1973-79 Before 1973, after 1979
Norway 1973-78 - 1979-98 Before 1973
Spain - 1989-98 - Before 1989
Sweden 1973-77 - 1977-98 Before 1973
UK - Intermittent - Before 1990
US - - - Entire period
Table 2.2: Presence International Constraints
2.2.3 Summary: National and International Constraints
Summarizing the above, Table 2.3 shows for each country the combination of both
constraints. Note that only few countries experienced monetary policy autonomy for
the entire period (the right column of Table 2.3; this, however, does not pose a prob-
lem as we nd a lot of variation in the left part of the table. This should give us
reliable estimates for MPA.
17 Source: Clark et al. (1998), own calculations.
18 Italy and the UK have left the EMS after the turmoil in 1992. Although not explicitly reported in
this table, this is captured in their MPA dummies. Germany has been the anchor currency in the EMS.
Therefore, we do not count the EMS as a binding restraint for German monetary policy.
8
National International Constraint
Constraint CBI For part of period For entire period
Above Median Austria, Denmark, Australia,
Germany, UK (1960-71) Canada, US
Below Median Belgium, Finland, France Japan
Italy, New Zealand, Norway
Spain, Sweden, UK (1972-98)
Table 2.3: National and International Constraints
In a regression analysis, we would therefore expect not to nd PBC in countries
that are constrained in either way. Clark et al. (1998) have shown this hypothesis to
hold for policy outcomes, such as ination or unemployment rates. However, this
test cannot reveal the precise role of central banks, since these policy outcomes are
inuenced by many additional factors (e.g. supply and demand shocks). If we nd
cycles in policy outcomes, we cannot conclude that the central bank actively creates
them.
To get comparable gures, we use monthly IFS data on the short-term interest rate
for 16 OECD countries. The sample period starts for most countries in the 1960s and
goes until 1997. Further details on the data can be found in appendix B.
3. The Results
3.1 Country-Specic Tests
To test our hypothesis, we divide the sixteen countries we consider into three dif-
ferent groups: countries experiencing no change in internal and external constraints
during the period of observation, countries experiencing a change in the external
constraint and countries experiencing a change in the internal constraint. For each
of these groups we describe the appropriate model specication and give estimation
results. For all country-specic tests that follow, the models include lagged depen-
dent variables and lagged disturbances if necessary, the order of which is determined
by examining the (partial) autocorrelation function and by performing a Breusch-
Godfrey serial correlation LM test.19 The model coefcients are estimated using OLS
techniques.20
19 The order of the lags is not reported in the tables.
20 The bias of the OLS estimator disappears since the number of time periods is large, see Kennedy
(1998), p. 149-150.
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3.1.1 No change in the constraints
The rst country-specic test we apply seeks to examine whether a signicant degree
of covariation exists between elections and the short-term interest rate for countries
experiencing no change in the internal and external constraint during the period of
observation: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan and the United
States. Following Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997), we start with the following
rst model specication:
Iit D 0i C 1iEit CX
j
jC1;iIi;t j C it (1)
where Iit is the short-term interest rate andEit the election dummy, which is dened
as C1 in the month containing a general election and the eleven preceding months,
and 0 otherwise.21
Three different cases are considered:
1. Cases having high levels of central bank independence and national policy au-
tonomy for the entire period of observation: Australia, Canada, United States.
For these countries political business cycles are quite unlikely.
2. Cases having high levels of central bank independence for the entire period
but national policy autonomy for only part of the period of observation: Aus-
tria, Denmark, Germany. These countries are more likely to experience PBCs.
3. Cases having neither constraint during the period of observation: Japan. Here
PBCs are most likely to be found.
The results for all three groups are shown in Table 3.1.22 None of the countries for
which we expect a PBC to occur yields a coefcient that is signicant.23 This is a
clear sign that PBC are not visible in the short-term interest rate.
21 We experimented with different election dummies. See Appendix A for additional estimation re-
sults.
22 The signicance of the estimates is marked with the superindex ***/**/* ifp < 0:01=0:05=0:1.
23 When interpreting these results, one must bear in mind that Japan is a special case: First,
elections are endogenous in Japan, which means that the parliament has the ability to call elec-
tions when the ruling party experiences a favorable situation. Second, the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) has maintained a majority in the House of Representatives (Lower House) and singularly ran
the government from 1955 until July 1993 (see the Web-Server of the Liberal Democratic Party,
http://www.jimin.or.jp/jimin/english/e-index.html, for details). Although the LDP has almost been an
a sure winner, which usually provides little incentives for political business cycles, it nevertheless tried
to maximize the winning margin. There is a broad consensus that elections are more likely to be held
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Only Austria yields a negative coefcient which means that the interest rate decreases
before elections. This behavior indicates a PBC, and the coefcient is signicantly
different from zero. This would mean that Austria, despite its relatively independent
central bank, experiences a PBC.
Country Coefcients S.E.
1. High CBI,












Table 3.1: The effect of elections on the short-term interest rate
A series of robustness checks can be done.24 We have added to all our estimated
GNP growth and the ination rate as explanatory variables.25 Qualitatively, this did
not change our results. We have also conducted all estimations with the real interest
rate, which we proxied by subtracting the ination rate from the short-term interest
rate. Again, our conclusions did not change. Similar robustness checks have been
conducted in all estimates.
3.1.2 Changes in the external constraint
Next, we consider the group of countries which experienced a change in the external
constraint during the period of observation: Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Norway,
Spain, Sweden and New Zealand. These countries are faced with low levels of central
bank independence and shifting levels of monetary policy autonomy.
when economic conditions are favorable for the incumbent (see Ito and Park, 1988), which is difcult
to capture in a common PBC model. See also Cargill et al. (1997) for more information on Japan.
24 See appendix A for results on robustness checks.
25 Growth rates have been estimated of the log of the raw series and detrended if necessary. All series
were stationary.
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In order to conduct country-specic tests, a dummy variableNOMPA is added to
model (1). This dummy has a value equal to +1 when a country lacks monetary pol-
icy autonomy. An additional dummy variableE  NOMPA is included as interac-
tion term, equaling +1 during electoral periods in countries lacking monetary policy
autonomy. Thus, the model specication for countries experiencing shifting interna-
tional constraints but no domestic constraint is the following:
Iit D 0i C 1iEit C 2iNOMPAit C 3iEitNOMPAit
CX
j
jC3;iIi;t j C it (2)
If our argument is correct that the absence of monetary policy autonomy decreases the
probability that politicians will manipulate the macroeconomy for electoral purposes,
we should expect the sum of the rst and third coefcient not to be signicantly
different from zero. Therefore, a Wald test is performed to test for1 C 3 D 0.
Country 1 S.E. 2 S.E. 3 S.E. 1 C 3 F
E NOMPA E*NOMPA Wald
Belgium -0.088 (0.156) 0.241* (0.129) 0.184 (0.191) 0.096 0.751
Finland 0.071 (0.270) -0.279* (0.146) -0.023 (0.296) 0.048 0.160
France 0.078 (0.125) 0.018 (0.091) 0.057 (0.167) 0.135 1.448
Italy 0.088 (0.119) 0.163* (0.098) -0.156 (0.170) -0.068 0.315
Norway 0.568 (0.753) 0.072 (0.379) -0.768 (0.768) -0.200 2.154
Spain 0.583 (0.574) -1.053* (0.561) 0.039 (0.866) 0.622 0.883
Sweden 0.261 (0.233) 0.298* (0.176) -0.173 (0.267) 0.088 0.476
N.Zealand 0.028 (0.141) -0.009 (0.156) -0.007 (0.275) 0.021 0.008
Table 3.2: The effect of elections on the short-term interest rate in countries experi-
encing shifting international constraints, but no national constraint
The results are shown in Table 3.2. As can be seen from the table, the sum of the
coefcients is not signicantly different from zero for all eight countries. This can be
interpreted in two ways: First, the absence of political business cycles in the short-
term interest rate is due to the external constraint. Second, a close inspection of the
table shows that the election dummy is never signicant. This implies that PBCs
never occurred in our sample at all, and that the additional test for the restriction was
in fact superuous.
For Belgium, Finland, Spain and Sweden the coefcient for the dummyNOMPA is
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signicant. Still, a simple interpretation cannot be given. A positive value (in the case
of Belgium and Sweden) indicates that during periods of exible exchange rates these
countries experienced higher interest rates, whereas in the case of Finland and Spain
exible exchange rates lowered the short-term interest rate signicantly. Our results
for Finland may suffer from data insufciencies (only one election period covered
during monetary policy autonomy), but still one would expect a clearer result whether
exible exchange rates tend to increase or to lower the short-term interest rate.
3.1.3 Changes in the internal constraint
So far we have not looked at Great Britain. Of the sixteen countries in our sample,
it is a special case as it experienced a change in central bank independence.26 This
change is captured in our third model specication:
Iit D 0i C 1iEit C 2iCBIit C 3iEitCBIit
CX
j
jC3;iIi;t j C it (3)
The estimation results are shown in Table 3.3. We estimate two different settings:
The left part of Table 3.3 estimates a pure PBC model, neglecting internal and ex-
ternal constraints. We see that the election dummy has the correct sign, but remains
insignicant. The right column reports the results if we include the changing level of
central bank independence. Once again, the coefcients remain insignicant, indicat-
ing that the Bank of England has not been very likely to engage in PBCs. The results
are quite in line with the literature. Similar ndings for the UK have been reported
by Clark et al.
3.2 Panel Data estimation
By pooling the data, we can directly examine the effects of cross-national differences
in the internal and external constraint. We use an autoregressive panel data model
with xed effects, in which the relevant parameters can be estimated using the LSDV
26 Great Britain experienced a change in central bank independence sufciently large for the CWN
index to place it below the median for one part of the period and above the median for the other part.
In 1971 the Bank of England became less independent, which means that our CBI dummy for Great




Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E.
2 : E -0.047 (0.109) -0.055 (0.132)
3 : CBI - - -0.109 (0.123)
4 : E  CBI - - 0.014 (0.236)
Table 3.3: The effect of elections on the short-term interest rate in the UK under
alternative specications
estimator.27 As before, the number of lags is determined examining the (partial) au-
tocorrelation function. Only estimates of the relevant dummy variables are reported
in the tables.
First, we focus on the impact of central bank independence. The constraint on PBC
behavior in terms of high levels of CBI can be modeled as follows:
Iit D 1i C 2Eit C 3CBIit C 4EitCBIit
CX
j
jC4Ii;t j C it (4)
The results are reported in Table 3.4. First, we only focus on the left column, that is
the i's.
As in our previous regressions, the estimated coefcients remain insignicant. This
conrms our ndings of the country-specic model. As before, we cannot detect
any pattern compatible with the PBC model. The result implies that elections do
not inuence the short-term interest rate, and as we do not nd any evidence for an
electoral pattern, the degree of central bank independence does not further inuence
our ndings.
Second, we examine the impact of monetary policy autonomy. The loss of monetary
policy autonomy of the existence of PBCs is modeled in the following way:
27 The LSDV (Least Squares Dummy Variables) estimator is obtained by applying the Within trans-
formation to eliminate the individual effects and then performing OLS on the transformed model. Since
in our sample the number of time periods is very large, the inconsistency of OLS estimates disappears,
see Baltagi (1995), p. 125-126.
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National International
Constraint (CBI) Constraint (MPA)
Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E.
2 0.032 (0.045) 2 0.069 (0.048)
3 -0.159 (0.129) 3 0.031 (0.048)
4 -0.033 (0.073) 4 -0.102 (0.071)
Table 3.4: The context-specic effects of elections on the short-term interest rate for
all countries pooled
Iit D 1i C 2Eit C 3NOMPAit C 4EitNOMPAit
CX
j
jC4Ii;t j C it (5)
The results are reported in the right column of Table 3.4. Again, the estimated coef-
cients i are not signicant. Moreover, in contrast to our expectations, the coefcient
for elections has a positive sign, which indicates that before elections monetary policy
is comparatively restrictive.
The interaction of the dummy concerning monetary policy autonomy with the elec-
tion dummy shows that if a country participates in a regime of exible exchange
rates, then the short-term interest rate is lower before elections. This is counterin-
tuitive, as it would imply that if a country faces less restrictions, the possibility for
PBCs increase.
Given these results, we have to reject the whole PBC theory as far as central banks
are concerned. We do not nd evidence that central banks actively engage in short-
sighted behavior before elections. Indeed, we have to conclude that if cycles occur in
monetary aggregates (as have been reported in previous studies), they are probably
scally-induced, but central banks should not be held responsible for them, as we
cannot nd a regular pattern in the short-term interest rate.
As a last test for the PBC theory, we exclude countries which perform poorly from the
pool. The main idea is that in order to nd out whether we can detectany evidence of
a political business cycle, we estimate the parameters for a smaller panel of countries
which we believe have yielded `good' estimates so far.28
28 This is certainly not the most `sophisticated' estimation method, but can be justied as follows: if,
after excluding countries with poor estimation results, still no evidence of a PBC is found, we can be
quite condent that there isn't one.
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Instead of pooling over all 16 countries, our sample now includes seven countries:
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, United Kingdom and United States.
The estimation results for this restricted sample are shown in Table 3.5. As before
the results in the left column are for the model with the national constraint, while the
right column reports the results for the international constraint.
National International
Constraint (CBI) Constraint (MPA)
Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E.
2 -0.080 (0.074) 2 -0.033 (0.079)
3 -0.205 (0.131) 3 0.133 (0.071)
4 0.082 (0.106) 4 -0.013 (0.107)
Table 3.5: The context-specic effects of elections on the short-term interest rate for
a pooled regression containing seven countries
The coefcients reported in Table 3.5 have the expected signs but still lack in signi-
cance.29
The signs of the coefcients show that before elections, the short-term interest rate
declines. An increase in central bank independence has similar effects, which can be
explained by lower ination expectations which (at a constant real interest rate) low-
ers nominal interest rates. Both coefcients are marginally insignicant. Furthermore,
we nd that independent central banks increase the interest rate before elections rel-
ative to central banks with low statutory independence. This last result is thus quite
in line with the predictions from economic theory. However, we have to stress that
these coefcients are not signicant at conventional levels.
The part on the right of Table 9 shows the results for monetary policy autonomy.
As before, in pre-election periods the short-term interest rate is lower. The absence
of monetary policy autonomy (thus participation in a regime of xed exchange rate)
yields higher interest rates. Again, the coefcient is marginally insignicant. The
combination of elections and no external constraint gives lower interest rates. How-
ever, this last result is highly insignicant.
To summarize, this last panel regression conrms our previous conclusions. Although
the signs of the coefcients are quite in line with our prior expectations based on a
combination of PBC models and internal and external constraints, the results are not
sufciently signicant to conclude that constraints effectively reduce the scope for
29 The coefcients of main interest, i.e. forCBI , 3 in the model for the national constraint and for
NOMPA, 3 in the model for the international constraint, are signicant at levels between 11% and
18%.
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electoral manipulations. Indeed, we nd little, if any sign of political business cycles
in the short-term interest rate at all. Our estimation results suggest that central banks
conduct monetary policy quite unimpressed from upcoming elections. Overall, we
conclude that central banks do not engage in political business cycles at all.
4. Conclusions
A large body of literature examines the relationship between central bank indepen-
dence and political business cycles. Similarly, the relationship between exchange rate
regimes and PBCs has been investigated, but strangely enough, the combination of
both has rarely been used. We have combined both approaches using a short-term
interest rate as a proxy for the use of monetary instruments.
We derived two pieces of evidence. First, our results for the country-specic tests,
based on the short-term interest rate for 16 OECD countries, are encouraging with
respect to central banks. Overall, we nd hardly any support for the PBC hypothesis.
Two possible explanations arise. First, we could simply conclude that central banks
do not manipulate interest rates before elections. This suggests that either govern-
ments do not have possibilities to force central banks to yield, or central banks have
effectively resisted government's wishes. Our results do not suggest that the degree of
statutory central bank independence matters in this respect. Second, our results could
be due to the fact that the short-term interest rate is not as tightly controlled by the
central banks as we have assumed. If nancial markets have a strong impact on the
short-term interest rate, under rational expectations manipulations are useless. This,
however, would have the following implication. If (as the theory suggests) central
banks use interest rate to manipulate monetary growth (and nally the ination rate),
and if their actions before elections have no effect on the short-term interest rate, then
PBCs  if they exist in macroeconomic data, such as GNP growth or unemployment
 cannot be due to central bank action, as these actions have no effect.
The second piece of evidence stems from our panel data regressions. We get more or
less the same picture, that is no evidence for central banks actively creating political
business cycles. However, one has to bear in mind that pooled samples are likely to
be biased by some outliers. Indeed, some countries behave `strangely', in that their
estimation results differ greatly from the vast majority of countries. If we control for
this and leave them out as we did in our last estimate, the results improve slightly and
are more in line with the PBC literature, but the coefcients remain insignicant at
conventional levels. We can therefore not conrm the PBC theory.
Overall, the implications are clear. If political business cycles in macroeconomic vari-
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ables such as unemployment show up, then the central banks should not be blamed.
Either their actions have no effect, or they simply do not engage in short-sighted
behavior.
Further research has to be done why cyclical behavior can be found in monetary
aggregates.30 Still, if one believes that central banks have the power to control in-
terest rates, then one has to reject the idea that central banks help governments to
win elections. If electoral cycles in monetary aggregates exist, they could largely be
demand-induced (perhaps due to scal behavior), but not due to central bank action.
30 Berger and Woitek (1997b) provide the argument that uncertainty before upcoming elections causes




We conducted a number of robustness checks to test our results. In the following
subsections we will report some of these additional regressions.
A.1 Different Pre-election Periods
Economic theory can give no clear recommendation how long we should expect the
pre-election period to be. Therefore, we have experimented with different lag lengths.
In the literature, lags with the lengths of 12, 18 and 24 months are commonly used.
CBI 1 year 1.5 years 2 years
Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E.
2 0.032 (0.045) -0.041 (0.042) 0.007 (0.042)
3 -0.159 (0.129) -0.196 (0.130) -0.162 (0.132)
4 -0.033 (0.073) 0.077 (0.068) -0.011 (0.068)
MPA
2 0.069 (0.048) -0.006 (0.045) -0.005 (0.045)
3 0.031 (0.048) 0.007 (0.051) -0.005 (0.057)
4 -0.102 (0.071) -0.012 (0.066) 0.012 (0.066)
Table 1.1: The context-specic effects of elections on the short-term interest rate for
all sixteen countries pooled with different lag lengths
Additional regressions with lags of 18 and 24 months, reported in Table 1.1 for the
model specication (4) reveal the following:31
1. The sign of the coefcients is dependent on the length of the election periods,
but
2. none of the coefcients are signicant. This result is independent of the cho-
sen election lag length.
Thus, for an election period of 18 months the coefcients2 and 2 have the hypoth-
esized sign, whereas for an election period of 1 year we obtain counterintuitive signs.
For an election period of 2 years, the results are mixed. Bearing in mind, that none of
the coefcients is signicant, the change in sign is not surprising and does not change
the overall implications.
31 Compare Table 1.1 with Table 3.4.
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1 year 1.5 years 2 years
Country Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E.
Austria -0.165*** (0.058) 0.083 (0.055) -0.144*** (0.053)
Japan 0.070 (0.061) -0.016 (0.058) -0.102* (0.059)
Table 1.2: The effects of elections on the short-term interest rate for different election
periods
Note, however, the two exceptions reported in Table 1.2 (in comparison to Table
3.1) for the model specication in equation (1). For Austria the coefcient is highly
signicant for election periods of 12 and 24 months, but not for 18 months. Also, the
sign is reversed. The coefcient for Japan becomes slightly signicant (p D 0:08)
for an election period of 24 months, but not for 12 or 18 months.
To sum it up, changing the length of the pre-election period does not inuence our
overall conclusions as the election dummies in most cases remain insignicant.
A.2 Real Interest Rate
We also ran regression with the real short-term interest rate instead of the nominal
short-term interest rate, which we proxied by subtracting the ination rate from the
nominal interest rate.
Compare Table 1.3 to the Tables 3.1 and 3.2 and Table 1.4 to Table 3.4.32 The columns
on the left give the estimation results if the dependent variable is the nominal interest
rate, the columns on the right give the estimation results if the dependent variable
is the real interest rate. We do not only see that the signicance of the results is
not affected by the use of the real short-term interest rate instead of the nominal
short-term interest rate, but also that for most cases the estimated coefcients are
surprisingly similar.
A.3 Additional Explanatory Variables
Finally, we included the GNP growth rate and ination as additional explanatory
variables. Both are detrended if necessary.33
Again, compare the Table 1.5 to the Tables 3.1 and 3.2 and Table 1.5 to Table 3.4 in
the paper. The columns on the right give the estimation results if the GDP growth rate
32 Results for Australia and New Zealand are not available.
33 Results for Australia and New Zealand are not available.
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nominal rate real rate
Model (1) Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E.
Canada 0.107 (0.158) 0.108 (0.158)
US 0.018 (0.095) 0.034 (0.098)
Austria -0.165*** (0.058) -0.164*** (0.058)
Denmark 0.058 (0.135) 0.057 (0.135)
Germany -0.032 (0.065) -0.007 (0.066)
Japan 0.070 (0.061) 0.071 (0.063)
Model (2)
3 : E NOMPA
Belgium 0.184 (0.191) 0.208 (0.205)
Finland -0.023 (0.296) -0.025 (0.296)
France 0.057 (0.167) 0.058 (0.167)
Italy -0.156 (0.170) -0.158 (0.170)
Norway -0.768 (0.768) -0.771 (0.768)
Spain 0.039 (0.866) -0.164 (0.713)
Sweden -0.173 (0.267) -0.173 (0.267)
Table 1.3: The effects of elections on the real short-term interest rate
and the ination rate are included as regressors in the model equation, the columns
on the left give the estimation results excluding these variables.
On the whole we see that the results are very robust.34 This means that the additional
explanatory variables do not change the overall conclusion of the paper.
34 In Table1.5 the robustness of the results for Norway and Spain is debatable.
nominal rate real rate
Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E.
Context dependent
2 -0.055 (0.132) -0.055 (0.133)
3 -0.109 (0.123) -0.102 (0.132)
4 0.014 (0.236) 0.009 (0.241)
Table 1.4: The effects of elections on the real short-term interest rate for the panel
model
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without GDP/ination with GDP/ination
Model (1) Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E.
Canada 0.107 (0.158) 0.157 (0.161)
US 0.018 (0.095) -0.019 (0.093)
Austria -0.165*** (0.058) -0.160*** (0.059)
Denmark 0.058 (0.135) -0.014 (0.144)
Germany -0.032 (0.065) -0.011 (0.068)
Japan 0.070 (0.061) 0.047 (0.062)
Model (2)
3 : E NOMPA
Belgium 0.184 (0.191) 0.238 (0.205)
Finland -0.023 (0.296) 0.120 (0.298)
France 0.057 (0.167) 0.048 (0.171)
Italy -0.156 (0.170) -0.321 (0.237)
Norway -0.768 (0.768) -1.878* (1.123)
Spain 0.039 (0.866) -0.393 (0.596)
Sweden -0.173 (0.267) -0.223 (0.267)




We mostly use monthly data from IFS statistics on industrial production, ination
and the short-term interest rate (line 60B). Additionally data have been provided
directly by the following central banks: Denmark, Sweden, UK and New Zealand.
Data for Germany have also been used from the CD-ROM Deutsche Bundesbank:
50 Jahre Deutsche Mark. Data for the United States have been obtained from FRED
without GDP/ination with GDP/ination
Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E.
Context dependent
2 -0.055 (0.132) -0.039 (0.134)
3 -0.109 (0.123) -0.067 (0.139)
4 0.014 (0.236) -0.001 (0.239)




Growth rates are computed as the change in the log of the raw series and have been
detrended if necessary. All computed series were stationary. The election dummy is
+1 eleven months before the election and during the election month, and 0 otherwise.
The dummy for central bank independence is +1 if the level of central bank indepen-
dence is above-median, and 0 otherwise. The dummy for monetary policy autonomy
is +1 if monetary policy autonomy is absent, and 0 otherwise.
The sample period differs for each country due to data availability. For the short-
term interest rate, the following data were available: Austria 1967:1-1997:12; Aus-
tralia 1969:7-1996:06; Belgium 1960:1-1997:12; Canada 1975:1-1997:12; Denmark
1972:1-1997:12; France 1964:1-1997:12; Finland 1972:10-1997:12; Germany 1960:1-
1997:12; Italy 1971:1-1997:12; Japan 1960:1-1997:12; Norway 1971:8-1997:12; Spain
1974:1-1997:12; Sweden 1965:12-1997:12; UK 1960:1-1997:12; US 1960:1-1997:12;
New Zealand 1973:1-1997:12.
Due to lack of election data, the sample period for Canada reduces to 1975:1-1996:07.
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